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Abstract—The primary objective of face morphing is to com-
bine face images of different data subjects (e.g. a malicious actor
and an accomplice) to generate a face image that can be equally
verified for both contributing data subjects. In this paper, we
propose a new framework for generating face morphs using a
newer Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) - StyleGAN. In
contrast to earlier works, we generate realistic morphs of both
high-quality and high resolution of 1024×1024 pixels. With the
newly created morphing dataset of 2500 morphed face images,
we pose a critical question in this work. (i) Can GAN generated
morphs threaten Face Recognition Systems (FRS) equally as
Landmark based morphs? Seeking an answer, we benchmark the
vulnerability of a Commercial-Off-The-Shelf FRS (COTS) and a
deep learning-based FRS (ArcFace). This work also benchmarks
the detection approaches for both GAN generated morphs against
the landmark based morphs using established Morphing Attack
Detection (MAD) schemes.
Index Terms—Biometrics, Face Recognition, Morphing, At-
tack, Vulnerability
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the widespread deployment of biometric-based iden-
tification and verification of individuals, it is essential to
observe a biometric characteristic that is reliable, user-friendly
and easy to capture. Face biometrics is well suited for this
purpose due to its popularity and widespread use for biometric
authentication. Moreover we consider the ease of capturing
from a distance in a non-intrusive manner and also the recently
achieved high recognition accuracy. These properties further
enable that face recognition is to be used in various applica-
tions that are attributed with high security requirements like
border control. However, biometric face recognition systems
(FRS) are known to be highly vulnerable to presentation
attacks (aka., spoofing attacks) against the capture device [14].
In addition face recognition system can be deceived during the
enrolment process by providing manipulated images [4].
Among the different types of attacks against FRS, face
morphing has gained momentum because of the high impact
it poses on border control security. The morphing process
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Fig. 1: Comparison of morphed images generated using Land-
Mark (LM) , MorGAN and StyleGAN
enables a malicious actor to generate a morphed image by
using an accomplice’s face image in a seamless manner [4].
The process introduces a significant threat to the border control
scenario as it is easy to obtain a passport document with a
morphed image. This fact is also due to the limitations of
current passport issuance protocols in which digital images
are submitted in a self-supervised manner by an applicant for
passport renewal through web services in countries like New
Zealand, Estonia and Ireland. In other countries there exists no
live enrolment in the passport renewal process, on the contrary
the facial image is provided by an applicant in printed form
and is subsequently scanned and re-digitized. This leaves an
opportunity for the applicant to morph the face image prior to
submitting it in the passport application.
A. Morph generation process and limitations
Early work on face morphing attacks [4] demonstrated the
vulnerability of FRS with respect to morphed facial images,
while to the same extend human experts could be fooled
[15] [5]. Following the recent works towards detecting morph
attacks on both digital image and re-digitized (print-scanned)
image [11]–[13] we must state that this area of research is still
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in a premature state. The crucial part of a morphing attack is
the generation of high quality morphed facial image, which
is ICAO compliant and can attack a deployed FRS with high
probability. In the literature, there exist two different ways of
generating morphed face images namely (a) Landmark based
morphed face generation and (b) Deep learning-based mor-
phed face generation. In landmark-based morph generation,
given two images, the landmarks of both facial images are
obtained and the Delaunay triangulation is generated for both
images. Subsequently alpha blending is performed to obtain a
single morphed image based on averaged Delaunay triangles.
The majority of the recently published literature is based on
open-source morphing tools [12] which are based on landmark
constrained Delaunay triangles.
A deep learning-based approach in contrast involves syn-
thesizing a morphed face image by using a Generative Ad-
versarial Network (GAN). Limited works are reported in the
literature on using GAN for morph generation [3]. The first
reported work in this direction is based on the MorGAN
[3] in which morphed images are generated corresponding to
a image resolution of 64×64 pixels. Recently, the morphed
images generated using MorGAN were super-resolved to have
a incrementally larger dimension of 120×120 pixels [2]. It
is important to note that the images generated using both
approaches incorporating GAN [3] [2] are not ICAO compliant
and hence have very limited use in real-life attacks. Irrespec-
tive of the morph image generation approach, it is essential
that one needs to generate a high-quality image that can pose a
high threat potential, when presented to a human expert in the
control procedure while the passport issuance is carried out
or to surpass a FRS during Automatic Border Control (ABC)
crossing scenario.
Morph using StyleGAN Morph using Landmark
Fig. 2: Illustration of minimal artifacts in morphed images
generated using StyleGAN versus landmark based face mor-
phing.
Motivated to address the limitation of low quality images
generated by the previous GAN architectures, in this work,
we present a new approach to generate high quality morph
images. The recent improvement made in GAN architectures
has enabled us to generate a high quality facial images with
a resolution of 1024×1024 pixels using StyleGAN [8]. This
is achieved by embedding the images into latent space which
is further optimized to synthesize the high quality and high
resolution image [1]. As illustrated in Figure 1 the morphed
images generated using StyleGAN can be observed to be
superior in terms of quality, resolution and visual depiction.
Further, as noted from Figure 2, a number of artifacts can
be easily handled in an automatic manner with the newly
proposed approach, which is capable of suppressing visual
artifacts. The clear superiority of the newly proposed approach
can be noted around the iris regions, where double edges are
inherently dealt with. While it well known fact that landmark
based morphs threaten FRS to a high degree [4], [12], one
can easily conclude the amount of extra time and resources
that is anticipated to make the morphs visually appealing by
removing the artifacts.
While the superior quality of face images can be achieved
through the newly proposed approach and eventually reaching
compliance to ICAO standards, we raise some fundamental
questions.
• Despite the high quality of morphed images do they scale
up to threaten a FRS in the same manner as the landmark
based morphs, which typically exhibit large artifacts?
• To what degree can current MAD mechanisms detect
such GAN based attacks on FRS, when the processing
is limited to the digital domain?
In the course of answering the above questions, we can
summarize the contributions of this work as follows:
• A new approach to generate morphed face images using
the StyleGAN is presented.
• A new face morphing dataset comprising of 2500 ×
3 = 7500 morphed images is generated using the Style-
GAN and MorGAN approach. In order to compare the
new approach using the GAN methodology, this work
also constructs a corresponding landmark based morph
dataset.
• To quantify the threats from GAN based morphed face
images, a comprehensive vulnerability analysis is con-
ducted using both, a commercial FRS (COTS) and an
open-source FRS (ArcFace).
• In order to give an insight into the detection challenges of
such attacks, this work also reports a detailed evaluation
of MAD mechanisms on both GAN based and landmark
based morphed face images.
In the rest of the paper, Section II describes the morph gen-
eration process proposed in this work using StyleGAN. Section
III provides the details regarding the quantitative experiments
indicating the vulnerability of FRS and the detection challenge.
With remarks on future works in this direction, we draw the
conclusion in Section IV.
II. MORPHED FACE GENERATION USING STYLEGAN
In this section, we present the StyleGAN based face morph
generation to achieve high quality face morphs. Figure 3
depicts the block diagram of the proposed framework for
the morphed face generation using a StyleGAN architecture
[8]. Given the latent code L1 of the faces, the StyleGAN
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Fig. 3: Block diagram of the morphed face image using
StyleGAN
[1] maps the inputs to an intermediate latent space (W )
through the mapping network. The mapping layer consists
of 8 fully connected layers that are serially connected. In
this work, we force a strategy to embed the face image into
the latent space (Wf ), which is inspired by earlier work [1].
This process enables us to synthesize the data-subject-specific
morphed face. The embedded latent space for a particular face
is then passed through the synthesis network consisting of 18
layers, in order to control the adaptive instance normalization
(AdaIN).As a direct result, we obtain the representation in 18
multiple latent spaces, each with a dimension of 512, which is
further concatenated. For a given face image I1, the embedding
is carried out by optimizing a loss function that measures the
similarity between I1 and the reconstructed image IˆL1 using
the corresponding latent code L1. To maintain the perceptual
fidelity a loss is computed as the weighted combination of
VGG-16 perceptual loss [1] as given below:
PL = min
4∑
i=1
λi
Ni
||Fj(IˆL1)Fj(I1)||22 (1)
Where, Fj is the feature output of VGG-16 layer conv11,
conv12, conv32 and conv42 respectively, λi = 1 and Nj is
the number of scalars in the jth layer. The optimization is
carried out using Adam optimizer with a β1 = 0.5.
We have selected the perceptual loss based on the visual
quality of the morphed image that can reflect the suitability for
border control applications. Let the final reconstructed image
correspond to I1 and L1 be Iˆ1 and the corresponding updated
latent code be L
′
1. We follow the same procedure mentioned
above for the second image I2 to get again a reconstructed
image Iˆ2 and the corresponding updated latent code denoted
L
′
2. The morphing operation is carried out by averaging the
latent code as follows:
LM =
w1 ∗ L′1 + w2 ∗ L
′
2
2
(2)
Finally, LM is passed through the synthesis network to gen-
erate the morphed image that has a resolution of 1024× 1024
pixels, where w1 and w2 indicate the weights, which we have
chosen to be w1 = w2 = 0.5.
A. Differences of proposed approach with earlier works
In contrast to earlier works [3], to avoid the bias of morph
generation with known set (closed-set), the StyleGAN is
trained using the disjoint face dataset from FFHQ dataset
[8] consisting of high quality face images. As it can be
observed from Figure 1, the morphed face images generated
using StyleGAN have higher perceptual fidelity as compared to
MorGAN based morphed images and are equally comparable
to landmark based morphed generation. It can be noticed
that, the MorGAN [3] based morph generation indicates low-
quality images that are not ICAO complaint rendering them
not suitable for passport applications. As a secondary note, the
MorGAN based images also indicate a poor visual similarity
to the contributing subjects, while landmark based morphs
exhibit stronger artifacts that are clearly visible in Figure 1.
Intrigued by the high fidelity of morphed face images,
we take a detailed analysis guided by a sample image to
compare it against the landmark based morph generation. As
observed in Figure 2, the ghosting artifacts in landmark based
morphing can be prominently seen due to the misalignment
of landmarks leading to several artifacts, especially in the
ocular, mouth and nose region. It is interesting to observe
that the proposed StyleGAN based morph generation did not
create any perceptual noise.The example demonstrates the
high quality of the generated image, when compared to the
MorGAN based approach.
While contrary to a landmark based morphed faces, the
proposed StyleGAN based morph generation does not indicate
a strong geometrical resemblance as it is the case for a
landmark based approach. Motivated by such visual observa-
tions and superior quality of morph images achieved with the
proposed approach and accounting for the lower geometrical
resemblance of contributing subjects, we conduct a detailed
analysis of threats to FRS as detailed in the next section.
III. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In order to measure the impact of the proposed approach of
morph generation, we first create a new dataset of morphed
images created from 140 unique data subjects. With the newly
generated morph dataset, we first investigate and report the
vulnerability of FRS and compare it with the vulnerability
reported in similar earlier work using MorGAN [3] and
traditional landmark based morphing. Further, we also analyze
the detection potential of morphed faces generated using the
proposed framework with StyleGAN.
A. Database Generation
We introduce a new morphed face database created from
140 individuals that include 47 female and 93 male data
subjects. The facial images are derived from the FRGC-V2
face database [10]. The newly generated database is sub-
divided into two sets for training and testing that consists of
independent data subjects with no overlap between the splits.
The training set consists of 690 bona fide images and 1190
morphed images. The testing set consists of 580 bona fide and
1310 morphed images. To effectively analyze the vulnerability
and provide a comparison to earlier works, we have generated
morph images using three different techniques, which include
(i) Landmark-Based (ii) MorGAN and (iii) proposed Style-
GAN approach. Care is exercised to generate morphed images
with similar facial appearance within same gender category.
Additionally, to guarantee high quality of the newly generated
dataset constraints of high quality illumination and no pose is
imposed before creating the morphs. The guidelines laid out
in earlier works [12] [16] are followed to obtain a database of
high relevance for morphing attack detection.
B. Evaluation Metrics for Vulnerability Analysis
We measure the vulnerability of FRS following the guide-
lines of Frontex and setting the operating threshold to FAR =
0.1 % (for both FRS). We further follow the realistic evaluation
protocol where the morph image is created by using two
face images corresponding to a malicious actor and and an
accomplice. We compute the vulnerability by enrolling a given
morphed face image MI1,2 and probing the corresponding
contributing subjects I1 and I2 with an image from a different
FRGC-session. We further obtain the comparison scores S1
and S2 for both images I1 and I2 against the morphed image.
The morphed image MI1,2 is only considered a threat if and
only if the comparison scores S1 and S2 succeed to cross the
preset threshold at FAR = 0.1%. If the condition is not met,
we simply consider that the morphed image is not a real threat
as the comparison scores are not able to successfully verify
the morphed image against both contributing subjects making
the morphing attack not realistic. We term this new metric
as Fully Mated Morphed Presentation Match Rate (FMMPMR)
and compute it in general form as:
FMMPMR
=
1
P
∑
M,P
(S1PM > τ)AND(S2
P
M > τ) . . . AND(Sk
P
M > τ)
(3)
Where P = 1, 2, . . . , p represent the number of attempts
made by presenting all the probe images from the contributing
subject against M th morphed image, K = 1, 2, . . . , k repre-
sents the number of contributing data subjects to the consti-
tution of the generated morphed image (in our case K = 2),
SkPM represents the comparison score of the K
th contributing
subject obtained with P th attempt (in our case the P th probe
image from the dataset) corresponding to M th morph image
and τ represents the threshold value corresponding to FAR =
0.1%.
When compared to the existing metric MMPMR [16], the
FMMPMR considers the number of attempts (that are assessed
jointly with contributing subjects) with regards to each face
morphed images and thus reflect the realistic vulnerability of
a FRS. The MMPMR [16] is designed to measure vulnerability
only on the morphed image in a joint set rather than a number
of attempts on each morphed image. Hence, the MMPMR fails
to reflect the number of attempts (by contributing subjects)
made against the corresponding morphing image to determine
the vulnerability of FRS.
In this work, the COTS threshold is set at τ = 0.5 based on
the NIST FRVT test reports as recommended by the COTS
provider while ArcFace FRS threshold is set at τ = 0.36
base on the face recognition trials on FRGC-v2 dataset. The
higher the value of the FMMPMR the higher the threat from
morphed images and correspondingly a higher vulnerability of
FRS towards morphed images must be stated.
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Fig. 4: Vulnerability analysis using COTS and ArcFace. The
scatter plots represents the comparison scores of morphed face
image against two contributing subjects.The red lines indicate
the threshold corresponding to FAR = 0.1%
C. Results from Vulnerability analysis
In this section, we present the vulnerability analysis using
two different Face Recognition Systems (FRS) (i) a Commer-
cial off the Shelf face recognition system (COTS), Cognitec
FaceVACS-SDK Version 9.4.2 1 and (ii) an Open-source
deep learning based FRS (ArcFace). To effectively benchmark
the results we also compare two different State-Of-The-Art
(SOTA) morph generation techniques such as landmark based
morph generation [6] and MorGAN based morph generation
[3].
Figure 4 shows the scatter plot of the comparison scores
obtained from two different FRS on images obtained using
1outcome not necessarily constitutes the best the algorithm can do
three different types of morphed face generation approaches.
Table I indicates the quantitative values of both MMPMR and
FMMPMR computed from two different FRS for all three
cases of face morph generation techniques. Based on the
obtained results the key observations made are listed below:
TABLE I: Vulnerability analysis FMMPMR(%) and
MMPMR(%)
Morphing Type
FMMPMR (%) MMPMR (%)
ArcFace COTS ArcFace COTS
Landmark based 86.04 98.91 95.76 100
Morph [6]
MorGAN [3] 0 0 0 0
StyleGAN 21.1 41.49 39 64.68
The following are the main observations from our experi-
ments.
• Landmark based face morph generation indicates a high
threat to FRS (analogously high vulnerability of FRS
to such images) compared to that of two other morph
generation methods. This can be attributed to the fact
that the landmark based morph generation preserves both
texture and geometrical structure of the morphed image
corresponding to it’s contributing subjects.
• The analysis of the experimental results also show that
MorGAN based morph generated images do not pose a
severe threat to FRS. The potential reason for this can
be due to low quality generated morph image (64 × 64
pixels). A careful observation of the images also revealed
the degradation of texture and geometry in the generated
morphed images. As a caveat, we note that the MorGAN
network is not re-trained (or fine-tuned) on closed dataset
of contributory subjects. The conscious choice was made
to investigate the generalisation of GANs for morph face
image generation and study the threats.
• StyleGAN based morph generation method shows rel-
atively higher degree of threats when compared with
MorGAN. Despite higher threats, the images from pro-
posed approach of morph generation did not compete
against the landmark based methods. An introspection
into this indicates the quality difference of FFHQ dataset
versus the employed FRGC-V2 dataset. Specifically, the
pre-trained morph generator is trained on FFHQ dataset
which has very different characteristics than FRGC-V2
dataset leading the network to mimic the characteristics of
the FFHQ dataset. Another aspect for the lower degree of
threat is due to lack of geometric correspondence of facial
structure in morphed faces when compared to that of the
landmark based face morphing. The lower geometrical
correspondence despite the high visual quality fails in
verification stage from FRS.
• When compared to ArcFace, the COTS indicates a higher
vulnerability for both landmarks and StyleGAN based
morph attack detection due to the high accuracy of ver-
ifying the subjects in COTS under different data capture
conditions as expected in operational scenario. Thus,
COTS while making itself robust about certain degree
of degraded data, also accepts the morphs to a higher
degree.
• Table I also indicates the distinction between FMMPMR
and MMPMR metric used to quantify the vulnerability.
The MMPMR reports high values in comparison to
FMMPMR as it does not account for the number of
attempts per morphing image. Further, we have also
measured the Relative Morph Match Rate (RMMR) [16]
that can account for the True Acceptance Rate of the
FRS. Since both FRS employed in this paper have
reached TAR = 100%, the RMMR is the same as the
FMMPMR/MMPMR.
TABLE II: Quantitative performance of state-of-the-art MAD
techniques on StyleGAN dataset
Morphing Type Algorithms D-EER(%)
BPCER(%) @ APCER
=5(%) =10(%)
HoG-SVM 10.29 17.66 10
Landmark LBP˙SVM 15.42 29.15 22.98
based Morph [6] Color Textures 1.57 0.51 0.17
CAN 4.8 4.63 2.4
MorGAN [3]
HoG-SVM 0 0 0
LBP˙SVM 0 0 0
Color Textures 0 0 0
CAN 0 0 0
StyleGAN
HoG-SVM 0.04 0 0
LBP˙SVM 0.68 0 0
Color Textures 0 0 0
CAN 0.36 0 0
D. Performance Metrics for MAD
The performance of Morphing Attack Detection (MAD)
techniques are presented using the ISO/IEC 30107-3 metrics
[7] such as Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate
(APCER (%)) which defines the proportion of attack images
incorrectly classified as bona fide images and Bona fide
Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER (%)) in which
bona fide images incorrectly classified as attack images [7]
along with the Detection Equal Error Rate (D-EER (%)).
E. MAD Detection Performance
In this section, we report the detection performance of
MAD techniques to understand the impact of different types
of morphing techniques. We have therefore selected four
different MAD techniques - LBP-SVM [11], HoG-SVM [18],
color denoising [17], Context aggregation Network (CAN)
[18] based on the recent benchmarks. Table II indicates the
MAD performance on all three different morph generation
techniques.
Compared to three different morph generation methods,
landmark based technique indicates a relatively high challenge
for the detection techniques, when compared to that of GAN
based techniques. However on the same kind of morph gen-
eration approach, the recent technique based on color texture
indicates the lowest error rates with D-EER(%) of 1.57(%).
While it is noted that the GAN generated morphs are easier to
detect, a possible reason can be attributed to the residual noise
[9] that is associated with GAN in generating these morphed
images. Even though StyleGAN can generate a high quality
images with a resolution of 1024×1024 pixels, the inherent
noise in the generated morph images make enables to detect
them. This is not the case for landmark based morph images,
which do not contain such characteristic noise.
F. Limitations and Future Directions
Observing the results from the empirical evaluation of
different approaches of morph generation both for threats
to FRS and ability to detect the morphs, we note certain
limitations in the current work as listed below.
• The GAN based morph generation does not impose the
landmark correspondence leading to high quality images
but not with high facial similarity in geometrical appear-
ance to contributing subjects. This has lead to lower threat
to FRS in comparison to landmark based morphs. Future
works in this direction can focus on imposing such a
constraint in the latent space, in order to increase the
threat to FRS.
• Despite the accuracy of MAD being very high, it can
be primarily attributed to digital pixel level information
helping to detect the attacks. A print and scan of the
the same morphed images can further reveal the real
challenge in detecting the morphing attacks as the print-
scan cycle looses the pixel level soft-information in the
image.
The future works in this direction will lead to establishing
the real threat landscape on FRS from the GAN generated
morphed face images.
IV. CONCLUSION
This work investigated the feasibility of generating high
quality morph generation and proposed a new approach using
StyleGAN. The proposed approach resulted in morphed face
images with a dimension of 1024×1024 pixels and no visual
artifacts. To indicate the real threat potential to FRS, the
morphed face images generated from proposed StyleGAN
were analyzed using a commercial FRS and an open-source
FRS. Further, to provide a fair comparison to earlier works,
MorGAN and Landmark based approaches were benchmarked
on the same set of data by creating a new morphed face
database. The set of experiments clearly indicate the that
StyleGAN based morphed face images do show threats to
FRS but to a much lower degree as compared to traditional
landmark based morph generation techniques. While detecting
the attacks stemming from GAN approaches is relatively easy
in the digital domain, the real challenge of detecting them after
the print-scan process is still not explored. In summary, we
answer the question - Can GAN Generated Morphs Threaten
Face Recognition Equally as Landmark Based Morphs?, our
experimental results indicates with a clear no in digital domain
alone.
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